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Jurisdiction and Case History
The Superior Court of California of San Luis Obispo
County has personal and subject matter jurisdiction, as
both parties, here, are citizens of California. C. C. P. 
Section 410. 10. Facebook- Inc., here, is headquartered
lin Menlo Park, CA., and is a citizen of, both, 
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Delaware, and California. The Federal Court of the
Central District of California determined, after the
Plaintiff' s initial filing, in case 2: 15- cv- 03758, that) 
the Plaintiff, here, is dual citizenship, and is a
citizen of the USVI, and California, after reviewing
two show of causes on citizenship prior to the
discovery period, and without adjudicating any matters
in the case. The case, there, was dismissed with
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
without any adjudication of any of the substantive
issues, involved in this case. See Court Record. 
Thus, this California State Court, here, has been
determined by the Federal Court, to be the proper Court
for adjudication of this case. 
Venue
Venue is proper, here, because both parties serve
customers that are located in the County of San Luis
Obispo and have substantial contacts with the County. 
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C. C. P. Sections 392 - 403. The Plaintiff actively
serves a number of physical store customers, which are
located in San Luis Obispo, along with the Defendant. 
Id. Moreover, this forum is the most convenient forum
for the parties, based on respective customer locations' 
for the parties. Id. 
Parties
1. Plaintiff is a Limited Liability Company, and has a
mailing address, at # 5 Company Street, Christiansted, 
USVI 00820. Attached, is its Certificate of Existence. 
Exhibit A. 
2. Facebook Inc., is a Delaware Corporation, and
headquartered, at 1601 Willow Rd, Menlo Park, CA. 
94025. The Company has an agent of process, at C. S. C., 
2710 Gateway Oaks Dr. Ste. 150N, Sacramento, CA 95833. 
Statement of Facts
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Havensight Capital LLC (" Plaintiff") owns and
operates, a number of consumer products companies, 
including: a soccer brand, golf brand, men' s razor
company, and a financial convenience company. The
Plaintiff relies primarily, on online advertising to
market its products, and services. The Plaintiff' s
existence is dependent, on, both, placing online
advertisements to drive sales, and recording customer
acquisition data, to understand the unique customer
acquisition costs, associated with marketing its
products, and services in the market. 
The Defendant, here, Facebook Inc. is currently the
only viable social networking option of notable scale
for online marketing. Facebook customers, here, are
able to check a success, and effectiveness reporting
tool that records the number of visits, to a specified
website that occur, as a direct result of a purchase of
Facebook' s online advertising product. This specific
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Isuccess reporting tool of the Defendant' s, is entitled
Ads Manager" on Facebook. The Plaintiff, here, 
purchased ads on Facebook, with the sole purpose of
gaining website visits, to a single specified website
address, for one of the websites associated with its
various business lines, on the following dates: Nov. 
11, 2013 Jan. 28, 2014, July 11, 2014, March 13, 2015, 
March 23, 2015, May
14th 2015, and May
24th, 2015. 
Further, the Plaintiff, here, in conjunction, also
utilizes Google analytics, a tool offered by Google
Inc, a third independent party to this case, on each
individual website that it owns, and operates. Google
Analytics, here, records all website visits, and data
associated, with such visits for all global online
traffic generated from the Web to a specified site. 
The Plaintiff, here, was shocked and outraged, to
find that the Google Analytics data did not reconcile
at all, with that of the data exhibited, on the
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IFacebook Ads manager reporting tool for the duration of
any of the placed Facebook marketing campaigns. In
fact, the differences in reported Website visits data
were materially substantial, and significant. For the
most recent campaigns, the Facebook Ads manager
allegedly reported website visits, to the specified
site at well over 30% more than those reported, on the
Google analytics, based on a campaign, in the high
hundreds of dollars, with hundreds of visits purchased, 
as the sample size. 
Moreover, the Google Analytics tool, here, records
not only the site visits, as a result of Facebook
marketing, but also all site visits generated from the
Web. Google analytics also records visits from spam
bots, and visitors that spend less than one second on
your site. Thus, the data presented in the Exhibits, 
which already reflect a 30% gross inflation rate of
successful visits to one' s site could be allegedly even
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Ifurther over valuing the actual traffic generated by
Facebook advertising. 
Additionally, this alleged over inflation practice
was observed for each and every campaign that was
placed by the Plaintiff, here, and roughly at the same
300 or more level. This seems to allegedly be a
pattern of fraud. Attached, for the Court are
screenshots from identical time periods of, both, the
Facebook Ads manager reporting page, and the Google
analytics reporting page from the most recent campaign. 
See Attached Exhibits B, C, D, and E. Both Companies
update the data, on these tools on a real time basis, 
and there is no reasonable innocent explanation for
such substantial discrepancies and over inflation, in
the reporting data. 
In Exhibit B, here, reflected is data collected
from a campaign, through the dates of May 17, 2015, to
May
17th, 
with the reading taken simultaneously at' the
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very beginning of May
18th, 2015. There is a
difference, here, of 378 visits, vs. 342 visits for
Google, which collects all visits, and not just visits
from Facebook, like the Facebook Ads Manager does. 
Additionally, in Exhibit C, here, data is reflected for
the single date of May 26, 2015, Facebook Ads Manager
reported 819 visits, vs. the 645 visits, which Google
reported. The Court should also take note, here, that
Facebook Ads manager reports, in a different section
all clicks on the Facebook Ad and not just actual
visits to one' s website from the Facebook Ad, which is
reflected in the Exhibited Data. The Defendant, here, 
cannot defend these discrepancies, on a beguiling
argument that the reported data, represents more than
website visits to the ad purchaser' s site, as an
explanation for the discrepancy, as this is simply not
the case. 
Further, although this is just two sample periods
frozen in time, the Plaintiff observed a similar amount
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of over inflation for all campaigns, across various
time periods. More importantly, the Facebook Ads
Manager displays a count of 378 clicks, at a random
pricing of $. 67 a click, which was not ordered by the
client, but is generated by Facebook, in contrast the
Google Analytics, which measures all traffic, including
non- Facebook ad traffic reported, 342 sessions. Id. 
Whereas, the Plaintiff paid close to .$ 25 a click for
each website visitor found, according to Facebook
alleged over inflated reporting, which creates a
discrepancy, in pricing of over 3000. Such a pricing
discrepancy is more than a product of a magical private
making market within Facebook, it is material and
substantial. 
The Plaintiff has relied, here, on this alleged
11fraudulent data to make business decisions, and
determine the feasibility of the market for products, 
and also has been allegedly overcharged for these
critical business marketing services, as a result of
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IFacebook' s alleged fraudulent conduct. Moreover, the
Plaintiff contends that a taking of these businesses
has occurred, here, as the Plaintiff' s launch depended
on these online marketing campaigns, and potential
Isuccess was constricted, as a result of Facebook' s
allegedly unfairly and fraudulently reporting, and
predatory pricing practices, on services delivered. 
Furthermore, the Plaintiff also believes that the
Defendant may have been enticed to engage in such
alleged fraud, as it possesses an illegal monopoly, on
online marketing, and social networking. There are no
other social networking service providers, which offer
such Website click marketing models, with a substantial' 
network size, as Facebook possess. The Plaintiff
believes that the Defendant' s illegal industry monopoly
is a driving force, behind this fraudulent behavior. 
Lastly, the Plaintiff also alleges that the
Defendant practices product tying, and Vertical price
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Ifixin , here, as it requires all customers to sign up, 
as social networking members and create a social
networking profile, in order to access the online
marketing products, offered by the Defendant. 
Moreover, the Defendant also utilizes a bid for
clicks model, which forces the customer to bid across
various online platforms for online marketing service, 
which is the very definition of product tying - the
forced purchase of different products. Furthermore, 
the Plaintiff is not allowed to use an online campaign, 
to market multiple products, or services, here. 
Facebook intentionally limits one brand cover picture, 
and website to be marketed for each respective
campaign, which makes the marketing services
inefficient, and unfairly costly, and is a per se
example of alleged vertical price fixing. 
In addition, the Plaintiff, here, has attached two
articles on Facebook, one published by CNET, and the
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other by Bloomberg, which are both respected sources. 
Exhibit F. and Exhibit G. The first discussed how
Facebook' s European marketing leader believes that they
should remove certain advertising products from their
mix, here, and that some of their products are unfairly
marketed, and improper, in his own words. The second
article discusses how the Billionaire leader of
Facebook purports to be bringing free internet to the
poor in South Africa, through a pseudo non- profit, 
which is owned by Facebook, called Internet. org. 
Unfortunately, the article notes that the customers are
actually only allowed to visit about ten selected
internet sites by Facebook, and are then encouraged to
purchase services from Facebook. This demonstrates
that Facebook perhaps allegedly preys on the poor, and
implements alleged improper pricing schemes, on a
global level, and in an all- inclusive manner. The
indigent are not protected from their greed. 
Complaint
Finally, the Plaintiff also, here, was restricted
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potentially public capital markets, in order to obtain
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5 capital for its business operations, as a result of the
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Defendant' s alleged fraudulent reporting, and inflated
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predatory product pricing for its online marketing
9 services. Venture leaders rely, on these customer
10
acquisition costs, and generated online sales, to
11
12 determine whether or not to allow, a startup company, 
13
access to capital. Thus, a taking of the Plaintiff' s
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The Court should probably find that the tort of
Intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage has been violated. In Youst v. Longo ( 1987) 
43 Ca1. 3d 64, 71, the Court held that there are " five
elements for the tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage, are: ( 1) [ a] n economic
relationship between the plaintiff and some third
party, with the probability of future economic benefit
to the plaintiff; ( 2) the defendant' s knowledge of the
relationship; intentional acts on the part of the
defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; ( 4) 
actual disruption of the relationship; and ( 5) economic
harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of
the defendant." Also See Ab Group v. Wertin, 59 CA 4th
1022, 1034. whether or not such a relationship exists, 
is a question of fact for the Court to determine, and a
Defendant can be liable for only having negligent
knowledge of any such economic relationship. Buckaloo
v. Johnson, ( 1975) 14C3d, 815, 830. 
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The Defendant, here, either, knew, or had
constructive notice of the fact that the Plaintiff has
contractual relations, with, both, existing customers, 
and potential customers. The Defendant, here, offered
online business marketing services, thus it is
reasonable for the Court to infer, here, that the
Defendant would expect this business online marketing
tool to be used for contractual relations. It also hadl
actual notice when the data entered Facebook' s physical) 
servers, which are in the Company' s possession. 
Specifically, here, business owners use Facebook
products, in order to create contractual relations with
customers, through the purchase of products online. 
The Plaintiff, here, used the Facebook online marketing) 
products, to create contractual relations with
purchasers of soccer, golf, men' s care, and financial
convenience products and services. 
Moreover, there was actual damage, here, to
contractual relations, and economic advantage, as the
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Plaintiff, here, alleges that the Defendant
fraudulently conveyed the number of potential customers) 
that were reached, as a result of the online marketing
purchase on a continuous, and methodical basis. 
Specifically, the Defendant, here, allegedly
inflated the number of website visits reported, in
excess of 300, which is neither, insignificant nor
inadvertent. Thus, the Plaintiff, here, lost potential
sales, and its economic advantage was damaged by the
Plaintiff making incorrect business decisions, here, 
based on the alleged fraudulent customer acquisition
cost data, exhibited by Ads Manager data, and the
Defendant arbitrary and inconsistent alleged price
fixing scheme. 
II. Unfair Competition and Trade Practices
The Court should probably find that the Defendant
has committed the tort of Unfair Competition and Trade
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practices. Under California' s Unfair Competition Law
l ( UCL) , Cal. Bus. of Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. the UCL
defines unfair competition as, among other things, 
including any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
fact or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or
misleading advertising." The Defendant, here, allegedly
jengages, in monopolistic behavior, and has violated
lanti- trust statutes, in its fraudulent conveyance of
marketing services. Further, it is the sole player, 
here, in the social networking online marketing arena, 
with any significant member scale, and leverages this
janti- competitive positon to unduly charge customers, 
clandestinely price its online marketing products, and
linappropriately misrepresent actual service provided. 
This is a direct violation of Section 15 U. S. C. Title
12, commonly known as the Sherman
IAct. 
Further, the definition of monopolistic behavior is
the power to " exclude competition." See United States
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v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377, 391
1956). The Defendant, here, is able to unfairly
exclude competition through its predatory pricing for
online marketing services, and fraudulent
misrepresentations, about the success of these
services. Specifically, the Defendant, here, grossly
inflated the success of its online marketing products
by 300, provides no transparency on pay for click
pricing, and abolishes efficiencies by requiring
customers to create completely separate campaigns for
individual products, and services. A customer can only
enter, here, on picture and website in a campaign. 
The Court can find liability, here, if the
Defendant has acted in any one of the following three
prong capacities: unlawfully, fraudulently, and
unfairly. State Farm Fire Cas Co. v. Superior Court, 
1996) 45 CA 4th 1093, 1104. " Unfair" is defined, as
any action, which contravenes anti- trust policy or
threatens competition. Id. Moreover, the fraudulently
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prong can be found to be satisfied, with any
presentation that is misleading by the Defendant. 
Boslina v. Home Loan Center Inc. ( 2011) 198 CA 4th 230, 1
129. Unlawful business practices can be found by the
Court, simply if the Defendant has committed an act, 
which threatens the laws of competition. Cal Tech
Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel Co., 
1999) 20 C 4th 163, 187. 
The Defendant, here, violated this Unfair business
tort, as clearly the prong of misleading, and
fraudulent representations in marketing, is satisfied, 
here, through the Defendant' s exhibited alleged gross
over inflation of website visits, as a result of its
online marketing services. Boslina v. See Attached
Exhibits. Specifically, the alleged misrepresentation
and inflation of website clicks on the Defendant' s Ads
Manager page. This behavior, here, has been shown to
be systematic, and continuous, as the Plaintiff alleges
that all purchased campaigns, demonstrated, this
Complaint
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Further, the Court, here, can also see that the
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Defendant has engaged in behavior, with the intention
9 of " excluding competition," through allegedly
10
exaggerating, here, the effectiveness, and success of
11
12 its online marketing products, and fraudulently
13
manipulating, the customer acquisition data, sent to
19
Facebook customers. State Farm v. See Attached
15
16 Exhibits. Further, the Defendant also has created a
17
predatory pricing structure, here, through its non - 
18
19 transparent bid for clicks pricing model, and has
20
unfairly raised prices on unsuspecting customers, here, 
21
as a direct result of these presented alleged
22
23 fraudulent conveyances. The Court has a duty, here, 
29
to protect the public from monopolistic companies that
25
26 allegedly take advantage of their position, to inflate
27
results, and unfairly overcharge customers for
28
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services, and do not deliver on what they provide to
the consumer, in order to remain illegally dominant in
the marketplace. Id. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Defendant' s own head
of European marketing states that the products are
dated, ineffective, and serve no purpose in his own
words, also lend support for the violation of the
alleged tort. Exhibit E. In fact, the Defendant
proclaims in the article that no one gives a expletive
about your website, referring to Facebook customers. 
Such a statement demonstrates a lack of respect for
Facebook' s customers, and a sense of entitlement across
Facebook' s management that such alleged unfair business
practices have probably inspired. The Court, here, can
send the Defendant a message that small business owners
need to be respected, products need to be priced
fairly, and products always need to be calibrated - and
not just defended on the hopes of boiler plate legal
jargon, which references potential ineffectiveness. In
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conclusion, the Court should find that the Defendant
has committed the Tort of Unfair business practices. 
III. Intentional Interference with Contractual
Relations
The Court should probably find that the defendant
committed the tort of Intentional Interference with
Contractual Relations, Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 406
Mass. 811, 812, 551 N. E. 2d 20 n. 6 ( Mass. 1990), the
Court held that a party is liable for intentional
interference with contractual relations, if a valid
contract existed, that defendant had knowledge of the
contract, that defendant acted intentionally and
improperly, and that plaintiff was injured by the
defendant' s actions. 
In this case, there was an intentional interference
with contractual relations, here, because the Defendant
probably had constructive notice of contractual
Complaint
12
3
9
5
6
7
a
9
10
11
12
13
19
15
1. 6
17
16
19
20
21
22
23
29
25
26
27
28
relations. The Defendant, here, offered an online
marketing tool for business owners, and for the sole
purpose of creating contractual relations with e- 
commerce customers. Id. The Contractual relations, 
here, were valid, as they were relations for consumer
products, and services, and the Plaintiff, here, 
allegedly was injured by the Defendant, as a direct
result of the Defendant' s fraudulent behavior and
alleged misrepresentation of its delivery of marketing
services. Id. The Plaintiff, here, had its businesses
damaged, as a direct result of being sent improper
customer acquisition data, overpaying for online
marketing services, and making improper business
decisions, based on the alleged improper data. 
Moreover, such allegedly fraudulent data also
materially affected, here, the Plaintiff' s ability to
access private capital markets, and potentially public
capital markets, to obtain capital for ongoing business
purposes. The Plaintiff, here, was improperly denied
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access to customers for potential sales of products, 
and was potentially denied institutional funding, based
on alleged improperly reported customer acquisition
data. Hence, the Court, here, can determine that a
taking of the Plaintiff' s business has occurred, as a
direct result of the Defendant' s alleged improper
pricing, fraudulent conveyances, and non- delivery of
undeniably critical online marketing services. 
This case is also analogous to Nautical Solutions
Mktg. v. Boats. com, 2003 WL 2607869, a Company
improperly used property to re -direct customer traffic
from one online business to another. The Court, there, 
found the Defendant to be liable for improperly
interfering with the flow of customer traffic between
sites. The Defendant, here, has either, constructive, 
or actual notice of contractual relations with
customers as it sells business ads, and the Defendant, 
here, has improperly affected those relationships, like
the Defendant, in Nautical Solutions Mktg v., through
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its alleged over reporting of website visits. Thus, 
the Court, here, should find the Defendant has
committed the tort of IICR, through its alleged failure
to affirmatively calibrate its products, and to provide
accurate data to customers. 
IV. Negligence
The Court should probably, here, find that the
Defendant committed the tort of Negligence. In U. S. v. 
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F. 2d 169, 174 ( 2nd Circuit
1947), the Court ruled that a Defendant, here, is
liable for Negligence if the risk outweighed the burden
of prevention of the obstruction. In this case, the
Defendant, here, should have known that its alleged
monopolistic behavior, and alleged fraudulent
conveyances, would materially affect small business
owners. Id. 
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Moreover, under the tort of negligence, a Defendant
Chas a reasonable care of duty to the whole world, and, 
here, probably had a heighted care of duty, as the
Plaintiff became an invitee, once a paying customer
relationship was established. Coates v. Mu1ji Inn, 
Inc., 342 S. E. 2d 488 ( Ga. App. 1986). The Court, here, 
specifically recognized an affirmative duty of care, 
and an even heightened standard for businesses that
rely on customers entering their premises, or using
their physical computer servers. Id. This duty is a
common law duty and cannot be waived by illegal boiler
plate contractual language. Id. 
The Defendant, here, has a duty to check and see if
its online marketing products are working properly, and
as advertised to the consumer. In fact, the Plaintiff, 
1here, could not imagine a more important business
investment for a social networking company, which
relies primarily on online marketing for revenue, than
a checks and balance system for the accurate delivery
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and reporting of online marketing services. Moreover, 
the Defendant, here, possesses tens of billions of
dollars, thus the burden of investing in system to
ensure that customers are not receiving fraudulent
service, does not outweigh the risk of obstruction, 
here, which is global damage to the businesses of
customers. 
Specifically, here, the Defendant was negligent in
its operation of Ads Manager, and in fraudulently
conveying grossly inflated success rates, in
conjunction, with amorphous, and non - transparent
pricing schemes. See Attached Exhibits. The
Defendant, here, did not provide the Plaintiff with a
price per click for the campaign on initiation and then
proceeded to fraudulently misrepresent the number of
customers that the products, drove to the Plaintiff' s
business websites. The Court, here, should probably
find that the Defendant was negligent, and protect the
public from such injustices in the future. 
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V. Vertical and Horizontal Price Fixing
The Defendant should probably be found to have
violated the tort of Vertical, and Horizontal price
fixing. A Defendant should be found liable for any
action that adversely affects the marketplace, and
competition, without legal justification. Marin Country
Bd . Of Realtors Inc. v. Palsson, ( 197 6 ) 16 C 3d 9201, 
930, 931. See also Custom Kitchen v. Owens- Illinois
Inc., ( 1987) 191 CA 3d 1341. Moreover, a Defendant can
also be found liable for the tort for " tying" products, 
under California Business and Practices Code Section
16727. This is where a Defendant forces a customer, to
purchase a separate product concurrently, with another
product which is marginally distinct. Id. 
In Freeman v. San Diego Ass' n of Realtors, ( 1999) 
77 CA 4th 171, 188, 189, the Court found liability for
the Defendant interfering, with the distributor' s
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ability to set, raise, or maintain prices through the
manipulation of capacity. Also See Kowlong v. Dow
Jones & Co. Inc., ( 1982) 137 CA 3d 709. Finally, the
Court has upheld this law on many occasions, and
recently in an analogous case, upheld a government fine
of close to $ 300MM for a tech company illegally
inflating the price of DRAM products, to their
customers. State of California v. Infineone Tech., 
2010 WL 3411378 ( N. D. Cal.) 
The Defendant, here, should be found liable of the
tort of price fixing because like in Freeman v., and
State of California v., the Defendant constrained
trade, and affected the market through allegedly
grossly inflating the results of its online marketing
1product, and engaging in Vertical price fixing in the
sales of its online products. Specifically, the
Defendant, here, allegedly represented that it had
delivered more website visits from potential customers
than it actually had, to the Plaintiff, and thus
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lallegedly inappropriately charged for these online
marketing services. See Attached Exhibits. 
Further, the Defendant, here, engages in Vertical
price fixing. Specifically, here, the Defendant
constrains capacity, like in Freeman v., as a Plaintiff' 
is unable to determine how much it will cost to obtain
a click for its business website upon purchase of
Defendant' s marketing products, and the Plaintiff is
constrained from marketing multiple products, within a
single campaign. This is clearly evidenced in the
exhibited data, which shows a 300% price increase
across identical marketing campaigns, in almost all
shapes and forms. Exhibits B, C, D, E. The Plaintiff in
one campaign paid close to $. 67 a click, and then $. 25
a click for another. As the Defendant allegedly
inflated the website click rate anyway, here, these
prices could be even more distorted, and unfair. There
is no reason why the Defendant, here, should not be
requested to demonstrate to the Court why these pricing
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discrepancies exist, after a through discovery period, 
on product calibration, and pricing schemes. 
The Defendant, here, operates an ultra clandestine
bid system, which generates inequitable prices per
Website click across customers, and its Ads creation
tool, here, does not allow customers to add additional
pictures or websites to a purchased campaign. This
monopolistic behavior creates market inefficiencies, 
and capitalizes, on the fact that other social
networking sites of Facebook' s scale, neither, exist, 
nor offer such online marketing services. 
Moreover, the Defendant should also be found to
have violated the tort of Price Fixing, here, as the
Defendant engages, in product tying. California
Business and Practices Code Section 16727. The
Defendant, here, required the Plaintiff' s staff to sign
up, and create a profile in its social networking
business, in order to gain access to its online
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marketing products. The Plaintiff, here, was not able, 
to purchase the online marketing products, without this
social networking sign up. This is product tying per
se, as the Plaintiff staff, here, was forced to sign up
for Facebook, in order to access the Defendant' s online
marketing products. 
Lastly, the Defendant, here, as mentioned above, 
also provides online marketing products only, in a bid
format, where a customer bids for clicks in a non - 
transparent virtual online market. This bidding
pricing structure, here, also constitutes product
tying, as the Plaintiff, here, allegedly is required to
make bids on a variety of different, and distinct, 
online platforms, in order to obtain potential website
clicks, thus bids on multiple types of online marketing
platforms are unduly being forced, on all of the
Defendant' s customers, as a result of the Defendant' s
predatory pricing schemes. 
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Moreover, such a bidding format, here, as also
mentioned above, does not provide for the Defendant to
commit to the cost per click of an online ad, rather
the customer is told through the Ad manager what price
per click is charged to the customer, based on
Facebook' s magical bid system. See Attached Exhibits. 
If the Ads Manager, here, demonstrates fraudulent
conveyances, regarding clicks, then the Court should
also consider, here, the Defendant' s non transparent
and inequitable pricing model, to aid in the fraud. 
This is per se Vertical price fixing. The Defendant is
constricting trade, and altering market forces by
charging individual customers different respective
prices for online marketing services, on a per click
basis. Perhaps, some content warrants a higher
marketing click price, but the pricing should still be
uniform for customers, either, across intended
industries, or, target audiences. 
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Furthermore, the Plaintiff has attached an article, 
on the Defendant' s pseudo non profit, which was
launched in South Africa. Exhibit G. The Defendant
advertised it as a non profit venture, in which it
provided free internet to indigent citizens of South
Afirca - a very noble cause for the almost trillion
dollar company. Unfortunately, the non profit only
provides access' to about ten chosen websites, and then
seeks to encourage the indigent citizens to purchase
services via their phones from Facebook. 
The fact that the Defendant would engage, here, in
such behavior supports the allegations of unfair
business practices, and price fixing. The Defendant, 
here, should demonstrate a stronger respect for small
business owner customers through its policies, and its
potential commitment to some kind of calibration
program. The idea that it is using these alleged
schemes on indigent people is abhorrent, and the Court
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should send a strong message to the Defendant, here, 
that such alleged tortious behavior is unacceptable. 
In conclusion, the Court, here, should find that
the Defendant allegedly purposefully engages, in
constrictive and fraudulent marketing behavior, whose
sole purpose, here, is to extort unduly earned money
from its customers, inflate the success of its offered
services, and solidify, its impenetrable industry
monopoly on online social networking marketing. The
Court has a duty to protect the public, and not allow
Facebook to continue to engage, in an alleged predatory
price fixing scheme, which capitalizes on its monopoly, 
and also emboldens the Defendant, to engage in alleged
fraudulent conveyances of the success of its products. 
Such Fraudulent conveyances of bid clicks, in turn, are
further increasing, the actual costs associated, with
the Defendant' s illegal price schemes. The Defendant
will continue to cause takings, here, of startup
companies, which rely heavily on the Defendant' s
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alleged marketing services, unless the Court, here, 
steps in, and sends Facebook a message, about these
Unfair business, and price fixing practices. 
Request for Jury Trial
The Plaintiff, here, requests the Court to grant a
Jury trial pursuant to Section 16 of Article I of the
California Constitution. 
Request for Relief
Plaintiff seeks U. S. $ 390 million, in compensatory
damages for the damage to, and taking of its business
property, and the damage to all exiting, and potential
relations with Plaintiff' s customers. Also, in Waits v. 
Frito Lay, Inc. 978 F. 2d 1093 ( 9th Cir. 1992), the
Court held that punitive damages are available where it
is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
Defendant is guilty of either, fraud, or malice. The
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Defendant, here, clearly engages, in fraud through the
alleged fraudulent conveyance of the website clicks
generated by its Online marketing products, and gross
predatory product pricing, thus punitive relief should
be duly granted, in the amount of U. S. $ 200 million, 
and a total of U. S. $ 590 million, should be awarded in
damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
s/ Benjamin Woodhouse
Benjamin Woodhouse esq. 
Havensight Capital LLC
5 Company St. 
Christiansted, VI 00820
805 478 1958
California Bar # 261361
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EXHIBIT A Corp Ho40PMOV911: 15: 06 AM
GOVERNMENT OF
THE VIRGIN ISLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES
CHARLOTTE AMALIE, ST. THOMAS, V1 00802
CERTIFICATE OF EXISTENCE
To Z1I1 To Vbom lgbeg e 3pregentg Obatt Come: 
I, GREGORY R.. FRANCIS, Lieutenant Governor of the Virgin Islands do hereby certify that
I arn, by virtue of the laws of the Virgin Islands, the custodian of the corporate records and the proper
officer to execute this certificate. 
I further certifv that the records of this office disclose that
HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL, I..LC
Limited Liability Company
was duly registered to conduct business in the Territory on August 19, 2014 and has a legal
existence as a Limited Liability Company so far as the records of this office show. 
Witness my hand and the seal of the Government of the
Virgin Islands of the United States, at Charlotte Amalie, St. 
Thomas, this 28th day of August, 2014. 
GR730RY R. FRANCIS
Lieutenant Governor of the Virgin Islands
40 0
ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION
OF
HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL LLC
The undersigned, acting pursuant to The Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act of the Territory of the United States Virgin Islands (the "Act"), adopt the
following Articles of Organization for the purpose of organizing a Virgin Islands
Limited Liability Company (the "Company"). 
1. Name. The Company's name is: 
HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL LLC. 
2. Designated Office. The physical address of the Company's - 
v c -- 
designated office is 2128 Company Street, Christiansted, VI 00@0. 
N
4945. The Company's mailing address is 2975 Bayview Drive PNmoc' 
c 
M
i I
Beach, CA 93449. U, n m
3. Agent For Service of Process. The name and physical adcressof rn
the initial agent of the Company for service of process is Trust ry
Company of the Americas, Inc. The physical address of the agent is
5030 Anchor Way, Christiansted, VI 00820 and the mailing address of
the agent is 5030 Anchor Way, Christiansted, VI 00820. 
4. Organizer. The name and physical address of the organizer of the
Company is Donovan M. Hamm, Jr., 5030 Anchor Way, Christiansted, 
VI 00820. 
5. Minimum Capital. The minimum amount of capital with which the
Company will commence business shall be One Thousand Dollars
1, 000.00). 
6. Term. The Company will be an at -will company. 
7. Management. The Company will be a manager -managed
company. The name and the physical and mailing addresses of each
initial manger of the Company are as follows: 
Havensight Capital LLC
Articles of Organization
Page 2
Name of Manager
Benjamin James
Woodhouse
Physical Address
2128 Company Street, 
Christiansted, VI
00820-4945
Mailing Address
2128 Company Street, 
Christiansted, VI
00820-4945
8. Liability of Members. The members of the Company will not be
liable for the debts and obligations of the Company as permitted by
Section 1303(c) of the Act. 
9. Purpose. The Company's purpose is to engage in any lawful act or
activity for which a limited liability company may be organized under
ry
the Act. 
o
r
Dated: August 15, 2014
I
C) 
Donov amm, Jr., Organizet m
Cn
ACKNOWLEDGMENT I =' o
C.n co C- 1
M
TERRITORY OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS o
JUDICIAL DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
ry
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 15th day'of
August, 2014 by
Notary Public
EILEEN DES JARDINS
Notary Public #NP -114-11
My Commission Expires: 12/ 14/ 15
St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands
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Facebook Ic,. ec warns brand.. 
How can a brand reach genuifte fans on Facebook and persuade them to go to.a show, buy a product or otherwise
support the brand? By paying, says Facebook's Niall .Fagan. 
Click "Like",to win! Click "Like" to find out more! It seems like we' re forever being begged to Like pages on Facebook; 
whether they belong to a company, a -band or a brand.jostling for. our -attention. But Facebook marketing boss has
warned that blindly amassing fans is " the biggestmistake.so many people are making" -- because "no one..gives a s" t
about your page!" 
Speaking on a panel at music industry conference Sound City 2015 In Liverpbol on Thursday, Niall Fagan, leader of
Facebook's entertainmenf.marketing vertical for Europe;:the Middle East and Africa; said, " I' d like'to be completely
honest. fans are not a metric that anybody should. rrieasure. on Facebook. Don' t go acquiring. fans just for vanity
reasons." 
First introduced. on Facebook posts in 2009, the cheery little -blue thumbs -up of the. Like button can now be found
everywhere across the Web. As.a social plug=in on websites, adverts. and articles like this one, it connects;your activity
around the Web to a brand's, page on Facebook- Companies,•.startups, celebrities and other brands launched a. frenzy
of urging customers to press the Like button on their page or products. 
Fagan now admits, "It's Facebook's fault originally for making it a thing to & ' but says, "It's the blggest`mistake.so
many people are making." 
That's because amassing a big' pool of fans on Facebook, the world's largest social network, doesn'tmean tliat in•the
future the brand will even be able to communicate with them. Facebook's algorithm. tailors what shows up in. our. News
Feeds, and a. brand' s post has a slim chance of making the cut. Unless they pay for it, but we' ll get.to that in. a second. 
Last year, Facebook began reducing the number of "promotional" messages showing up in users' News Feeds, 
meaning companies that previously sent ads from their free Facebook pages now face a harder time reaching fans: 
Fagan says there are simple ways to genuinely reach fans on Facebook. " If you are a. musician or you manage a band, 
get that band to do a 20- or 30 -second video clip of a well-known cover song, or just something a little bit quirky, a
Idle bit different. If you run that video against an audience of people you are confident will love that video, you can
build an audience off the people who watched it to the full length." 
Shorter videos work better on Facebook, especially when it directs you to a full- length video on YouTube,. a track.on Spotify; or any
other place where a' fan watching and listening will actually earn you some money -While Facebook doesn' t directly pay out when
someone watches a video or interacts with a brand, it does give the opportunity to;reach potential new fans are who are.likely to
spend' money. That's through. a feature called Lookalike Audiences, which allows brands.to find people with similar interests.or
background to current fans. 
So if you ran that video against 100,000 people;' explains Fagan, " and 10,000 people watched it right through to. the end. F.acebbgk
Will say, 'here's those 10,000 people'. And you can say, ' I don' t want to targetthose'10,000 because th'ey've already watched It', but,you
can. use Lookalike Audiences to show you people similar to these 10,000: that live in London, that are over•18, that are male,:whaiever
you want. It's targeted. 
And that's how you get awareness on Facebook — not through ' Like my page'. No-one gives a s" t about your page!" 
When tliat little truth bomb sent a ripple of laughter around the room, Fagan qualified his statement by pointing otit.that a Like clicked
does not a genuine. fan make. 
The truth is; looking at all football clubs in the UK or anywhei-6.4 a' football club has 50 millions fans, 25 million of those.fans are fans
of their biggest rival;' says Fagan. " So if you' re [Spanish soccer club] Real Madrid and you're posting 'a.bout 0 -player you've just signed, 
you have no control where the message. is going to go. It may verywell go to fans of Barcelona [ a nval.Spanish soccer club]. The.only
real way to reach fans of Real Madrid is, yeah, post on' your page, but target people that are also fans of Ronaldo or things that make it
obvious that they've been to [Real' s stadium] the Bernabau, they' re fans of [Real striker] Ronaido, they're fans of a player that other
teams wouldn't consider a hero. That's how you.get to the real fans.. 
At the time of writing, Real Madrid' s Facebook page has 82 million Likes. 
Most fan pages acquire fans in the wrong way, through competitions and stuff," Fagan said. 
But while that gets people clicking Like, it doesn' t go the extra mile to actually reaching genuine fans and persuading them to go to a
show, buy a product or otherwise support the brand. How can a brand achieve that? By paying, obviously. 
When I asked Fagan to qualify his statements, he said, " Having a page is important. Hosting a: page and hoping everybody.sees it is
the problem. That's the myth With the decline in organic traffic [people clicking on unpaid posts] you' re. just.getting no reach: That
number [of fansj. might look pretty, but eventually none of them will see it, unless you pay for it." 
Fagan reckons brands have to put their money where their mouth is to boost their posts into News Feeds, even if
they're reluctant to pony up cash to a network that's supposed to be free. 
All the' clients I work with, every single one of them, is very wary of spending money with Facebook" he said, "They
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free-web- access? cmpid=yhoo
Facebook to Offer South African Cell C Users Free Web Access
Christopher Spillane
June 24, 2015 — 3: 30 AM PDT
Facebook Inc. will offer customers of Cell C Pty Ltd. access to its free application Internet.org in South
Africa as the social -networking service seeks to add users in the continent' s most developed economy. 
The service will allow Cell C users to see Facebook and about 30 websites offering information about
healthcare and jobs without being charged for data, Markku Makelainen, Facebook' s director of global
operator partnerships, said in an interview on Wednesday. It will be available from July. 
It' s a method for users who want to try out free basic services on the Internet, they can do it without
any cost and then they can basically move up the ladder to paid services," Makelainen said at Cell C' s
Johannesburg headquarters. " We want to take away the fear of use. Less than half of the population is
connected." 
Facebook Chief Executive Officer Mark Zuckerberg is pushing Internet.org to bring online access to
people who can' t afford it around the globe. More than 1. 1 billion people worldwide don' t have access
to the Internet, according to estimates by McKinsey & Co. 
Customers of Cell C, the third- largest South African wireless carrier, will have free data access to the full
version of Facebook' s application for two months before downgrading access to a more basic version of
the service. 
After the promotion basically we' ll take away the baby pictures and cat videos," Makelainen said. " If
users want to see the full experience then getting a data plan from Cell C obviously enables the full
Facebook." 
